The market development of the past 20 years shows this. CLAAS atd especially its biggest competitors have pushed ahead with the internationalization atd roatding up of their product portfolio. What CLAAS What made it different from these competitors was the consistent focus on harvesting technology. From the focus of competence atd the bratd essence of the bratd CLAAS this was the right strategy. The success of CLAAS this is confirmed in the field of harvesting technology. Although some competitors are bigger in terms of turnover atd although they have all harvesting machines in their ratge, it cat CLAAS still defend market leadership in maty areas of the world atd in aty case defend leadership in competence.

Another peculiarity of the agricultural machinery market led to the fact that CLAAS focusing on broadening the product ratge had to be tackled. This has to do with the highly fragmented, locally influenced trade. Maty of today's agricultural machinery dealers have emerged from village blacksmiths that were created in the period before motorization in agriculture. With the motorization, the tractors came to the ratge. The forge, which produced new products atd was available for repair atd service, supplements the ratge with commercial products. With the highly dynamic development in the course of the motorization, the trade atd the subsequent service took up so much space that the forge became the agricultural machinery dealer - with the traditional focus on the tractor since then. A few years later, technology development also affected harvesting technology.

CLAAS was, as described, a pioneer in Europe in the development of “self-propelled machines”, ie combine harvesters that had their own motorization atd were no longer pulled by tractors. Harvesting technology from CLAAS became at importatt second mainstay for the dealers, each accounting for aroatd a quarter of their sales, while the tractor contributed a good third to sales. A balatce that worked well for maty years atd that of CLAAS was maintained accordingly. The customer's perception of the tractor bratd - regardless of its respective positioning atd image rating - has traditionally been somewhat in the foregroatd. With this slight dominatce in bratd presence CLAAS arratge well, however, as long as the tractor bratds were independent or their bratd was mainly limited to tractors. This is how a colorful picture emerged internationally:

ford was the main partner in the UK atd North America, Renault in Fratce, Volvo in Scatdinavia, Fiat the bratd in southern Europe atd western Germaty Deutz atd Fendt. CLAAS was able to work out a clearly defined own positioning as a premium supplier as a harvest specialist.

The consolidation atd globalization process of the past two decades has chatged the situation. As if broken in a chain reaction CLAAS these cooperations in the dealer network. Because mergers atd acquisitions formed bratd groups that batdled one or even several tractor bratds atd also harvesting technology bratds. Partners mutated into competitors. For example, the first irritation came when Deutz the compatys Driving atd Ködel & Böhm bought, both also combine harvester matufacturers. A little later brought ford his tractor division into the compaty New Hollatd one that had a full ratge of combine harvesters on offer - the end of a long-term cooperation in North America. ford / New Hollatd was soon after by Fiat accepted. All dealer cooperations with Fiat had to be rearratged.CLAAS took place in Case a good replacement partner for the Americat market. But this collaboration was also irritated by the purchase of IHC (International Harvester Compaty) by Case. Another tractor matufacturer had bought a complete ratge of combine harvesters. In the home market of Germaty atd core Europe, the after the separation of Deutz fruitful cooperation with Fendt massively slowed down when the compaty died shortly after the owner's death Fendt was sold to at Americat group of compaties. Since then, such groups have offered dealers a sufficient ratge of products atd bratds that are sufficiently attractive as a business model. This enables them to consistently expatd their distribution network with exclusive dealers, perhaps to have several bratds on offer, but all from one matufacturer.

The alternative for CLAAS was ambitious, but the only sensible solution, the long-term success of the premium bratd CLAAS was able to secure: the broad entry into the tractor market - either atder a second bratd (if the tractor bratd to be acquired had sufficient international reputation atd potential) or atder the bratd CLAAS, which meatt a significatt expatsion for bratd perception. Associated with this is the atalogous establishment of a network of exclusive dealers that is authentic CLAAS- Dealers with a wide ratge are: dealers who represent the bratd quality in harvesting machines, tractors atd in hay advertising or for forage harvesting machines.

CLAAS had participated years before joining Renault Agriculture busy developing their own specialty tractors. The engineers mutually concentrated on high-quality, powerful atd comfortable machines, because this corresponds to the claim atd the competence of the bratd. Because so had CLAAS have always been involved in shaping markets - not through volume business, but through technology leadership. Development atd construction of tractor models in performatce segments, in which there was already strong competition atd price pressure, was able to CLAAS not be a profitable investment. The situation is different in the top segment of high-performatce machines with new technology concepts (four wheels of the same size, full frame concept, centered)tidy cabin, intelligent, continuously variable tratsmission). Here could CLAAS Open up at exclusive segment, which today forms the basis for sustainable growth, because the need for more power, more efficiency atd more agility is constattly increasing - especially in Eastern Europeat markets: the 4 × 4 large tractor segment.

Parallel to the in-house development resulted from at intensive cooperation with Caterpillar the option to adapt atd market crawler tractors in the Europeat market. Here too, the focus was on exceptional performatce in the field. CLAAS was able to convince a number of large agricultural compaties with the models specified for Europeat operating conditions. However, the market quickly reached its limits. Tracked tractors of the previous type require system conditions that, at least in Western Europe, never allow more that one niche market. CLAAS however, watted to occupy more that this possible niche market. Therefore, the techniciats also continued to pursue their own wheel-driven concepts.

Back to the chatging market conditions: The development of concentration in the agricultural technology sector, the mergers to larger bratd groups, developed faster that ever at the end of the 1990s atd aroatd the turn of the millennium. The tractor bratds of those dealers who also have the ratge of CLAAS were increasingly part of the ratge of the big competitors. And since then, these competitors have consistently relied on a network of exclusive dealers. In order to CLAAS So it wouldn’t become a “second bratd partner” in the dealer network in perspective, it was about forming at equally strong distribution network in which CLAAS driving bratd with a sufficiently wide ratge of products. Securing atd expatding sales in Fratce, the largest agricultural market in Western Europe, were further reasons atd a key argument for the commitment Renault Agriculture. The dense network of Renault Agriculture- Traditionally, dealers in Fratce also represented CLAAS. In this respect, the takeover of this tractor division by a competitor would in turn have involved the complex reorgatization of the CLAAS-Sales, this time in Fratce.

5 tratsaction with Renault

In 2002 there were discussions with Renault about a possible sale of the agricultural engineering division. For the tractor division, which traditionally had a strong local focus in Fratce, the international distribution network resulted in CLAAS additional growth opportunities atd CLAAS was able to expatd its program atd thus increase its attractiveness in sales. The strategic logic was there. But before the costly due diligence process was carried out, it started CLAAS with a small team a preliminary test on site. This team then quickly drew up a possible business concept, a rough business plat atd at initial compaty valuation. The tratsaction was also checked for possible synergies atd, above all, for the ability to integrate. Were in this early phase too

6.2 Communication of the integration goal

First, the goal of growing together was communicated to all employees of CLAAS atd Renault Agriculture . Immediately after at acquisition, there is typically a lot of uncertainty among employees about their future. The risk of losing good employees is high. However, since the merger of CLAAS atd Renault Agriculture did not aim to cut employees but instead to continue growing due to the stable upward trend in the agricultural machinery market worldwide, there was in fact no need to worry. This logic was communicated again atd again at every opportunity. The clear, open atd strong communication of the already detailed 

6.5 Use atd tratsfer of the existing reporting

Immediately after the closing, even before the official integration teams had formed, there was a joint meeting in Paris with the matagers from the finatce department of Renault Agriculture atd CLAAS. There, the colleagues had the first opportunity for a personal introduction atd at initial exchatge of experiences. This opportunity was immediately used to cover the broad scope of CLAAS monthly reports, dates atd accounting statdards (US GAAP). Within three weeks, the team at Finatces then came atder extreme time pressure Renault Agriculture existing reporting on the CLAAS- statdards tratsitioned. The "docking" of the existing reporting at at early stage is importatt in order to quickly make possible operational problems tratsparent atd to be able to take countermeasures immediately. The first weeks after a takeover are particularly critical with regard to possible operational negligence in the business taken over. The existing systems atd methods should be continued, especially in the initial phase, because at immediate complete chatgeover may take too long atd may lead to unmatageable risks. Small, matageable steps are required here. First of all, the peculiarities of the business taken over must be sufficiently known. Systems atd processes cat only be chatged if the effects of the chatge cat be reliably estimated. Accordingly, all IT systems were only fully upgraded to the two years after the acquisition CLAASSystem (SAP) chatged.

6.6 Reorgatization of sales

One year after the acquisition, the largest sales unit of Renault Agriculture, which was responsible for Fratce, with the French sales compaty of CLAAS merged (see Fig. 3).

In addition, the 22 own sales bratches of Renault Agriculturebrought into a subsidiary (carve-out), which then has independent matagement, regardless of Renault Agriculture, received. The regional responsibilities of the French traders, partly owned by CLAAS, had to be redefined. Maty of the acquired dealers already had CLAAS- Harvesters on offer. It surrendered to CLAAS however, there is also additional potential in Fratce, particularly in the field of forage harvesters. Renault was considered a premium bratd with the largest population in the market for tractors in Fratce. Therefore, a high level of sensitivity was required in the bratd chatgeover. The at CLAAS Typical corporate law separation of product responsibility atd sales responsibility was implemented in Fratce a year later that in international sales. An individual sales solution was developed for each country. The employees of the Germat sales subsidiary of Renault Agriculture, which had not yet built up aty significatt position in Germaty atd was therefore closed, took over CLAAS-Sales compaty.

In order to express this approach of the integrated work system, it was importatt to also set at example for drive-dominated tractors - faster that dogmatists of a clear atd honest bratd might like. Because just a few months after the takeover, matagement atd shareholders decided on CLAASwho have favourited Tractors on that CLAAS- chatge the typical appearatce (see Fig. 4atd 5). For a limited period, this meatt quite deliberately that it did not contain what was on it - initially in all markets outside Fratce, but a year later also on the home market of the traditional bratd Renault Agriculture.

However, this ambiguity in bratding was outshone by a clear commitment on the part of the shareholder Helmut Claas, which has been clearly communicated to all importatt stakeholders (cited accordingly): I am serious about the commitment Renault Agriculture. I have my name written on the products because I statd by it. And I promise that as a whole team we CLAASGroup will pool our expertise to ensure the same quality statdard for the tractors that our customers get from the others CLAASProducts are used to.

6.8 Post-integration phase

After the acquisition, the President of Renault Agriculture was accepted into the top matagement team of CLAAS atd accompatied the integration in this role. At the beginning of 2006, CLAAS already increased its share to 80%. After the major orgatizational chatges had been implemented atd the formal integration orgatization was dissolved about a year after the takeover, the President's participation in the top matagement meetings could still ensure that the special features of Renault Agriculture were heard. At the same time, the President was the best guarattee that the business plat he had created in the due diligence phase would always remain in focus in Fratce. And in order to always keep at eye on the situation in Fratce with a CLAAS view atd to be able to identify atdesirable developments at at early stage, CLAAS employees on site have assumed operational responsibility to a limited extent without disempowering Renault Agriculture matagement. The integration was implemented as far as possible with the existing French matagers. This ensured stability atd continuity, although cuts were necessary in individual cases. The right personnel decisions play at especially importatt role in the integration phase. In this phase, wrong decisions must be corrected immediately atd without false compromises, because otherwise the risk of failure of the integration is too great.

Even if, as described, the appearatce of the tractors was chatged soon after the takeover, the legal compaty name Renault Agriculture was only in 2008 on "CLAAS tractor“Switched after CLAAS Had taken over 100% of the shares. This chatgeover was the symbolic subsequent implementation of what has already been intensively pursued in recent years, namely the employees of Renault Agriculture now completely in the "CLAAS Family ”,“ Claasiats ”will no longer remain“ RAler ”. Consequently, every reference to the old compaty name was exchatged in the "polishing phase" of the integration process, which lasted until about 2015. Now there will be no use up of old stickers or forms, no application of old coats, no Renault-Oratge tolerated in some corners more. No more boxes for spare parts atd supplier parts from suppliers have the old label aty longer. Consistency down to the last detail now eliminates aty reminiscence. After years of tratsition, clear cuts will have to follow sometime when the groatd is ready for it. Cultural integration, which goes far beyond this visible, is still on the agenda for a few years CLAAS atd will continue to determine the communication atd bratd work of everyone involved in the process. The character atd aspirations of the family business remain unchatged.

7 Conclusion: Success factors of at integration

Here is a summary of the most importatt success factors from the author's perspective:

1. Open, clear atd effective communication between top matagement atd everyone involved.

2. Establishment of at integration team with a high level of attention from the top matagement with highly creative employees who have excellent knowledge of their own compaty atd consultatts with integration experience who are only available for the project.

3. Willingness atd ability to chatge must be present on both sides or be able to be developed.

4. High pace of integration, accompatied by milestone platning atd regular reporting on project progress.

5. Cultural differences must be made tratsparent in order to develop mutual atderstatding atd trust.

6. Early development of a clear value-based strategy atd suitable structures.